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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Divorcing parties stipulated to a form of decree that would merge all provisions of a 
mediated property division, keeping them subject to modification for materially changed 
circumstances in the future. After pro-se husband (appellant here) had signed and handed back 
(to wife's attorney) the stipulation for entry of the "attached" form of decree, however, a different 
form of decree was substituted and attached to the stipulation for its actual presentation to and 
entry by the magistrate. The substituted form of decree deleted the language 
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 
2007 is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this 
decree of divorce and" 
from the bottom of the first page, leaving only the following language - at the top of the second 
page, which of course lay covered by the first one: 
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 
2007 is hereby merged and incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for 
Paragraph L which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between 
the parties." 
"Paragraph L" was a spousal support provision pursuant to which husband paid wife some 
$93,000 over a span of about 42 months, by which time his financial circumstances mirrored the 
rest of the economy and he could no longer afford to support his own family and his ex-wife. 
When he moved the magistrate to terminate the spousal support obligation for materially 
changed circumstances, however, wife's new attorneys successfully urged the second iteration of 
paragraph 2 as precluding modification. Wife then sued in District Court breach of the 
supposedly "not merged, separate contract" to pay her $2,200 per month for ten years, 
whereupon she was granted summary judgment. 
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Course of proceedings and disposition below. 
Divorcing couple successfully submitted their property division and child custody issues 
to mediation, yielding an eleven-page Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement 
Agreement ("mediated agreement") that included a spousal support provision ("Paragraph L") 
benefitting wife. Thereupon, the office of wife's then-attorney presented appellant husband (who 
was pro se) with a stipulation for entry of judgment and decree of divorce 
" ... in the form attached to this Stipulation." 
Empnasis added. (C.R. 177) As reflected both in the wife's own affidavit in support of summary 
judgment (C.R. 105-128) and in husband's affidavit in opposition (C.R. 129-138), the "form 
attached" to the stipulation presented to, signed and handed back by the pro-se husband included 
the following at the very bottom of its first of two pages: 
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 
2007 is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this 
decree of divorce and" 
(C.R. 108 and 136; Appendix A hereto for convenience.) The "form" submitted by wife's 
counsel to the magistrate for entry, however, was not the above form to which husband had in 
fact stipulated - but a very different one (C.R. 175), attached as Appendix B. In this "form," 
the masthead of counsel has been moved down the page several lines, resulting in the total 
elimination of the "approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this decree of 
divorce" language, leaving in place - on the second page - only the paragraph that read: 
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 
2007 is hereby merged and incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for 
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Paragraph L which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between 
the parties. " 
C.R. 175-176, emphasis added. 
It was this changed "form" - rather than the form that was attached to the stipulation when 
husband signed it - that wife's counsel submitted to the magistrate and the magistrate entered. 
C.R.175-176; 129-138. 
Husband had paid wife over $90,000 pursuant to the spousal support provision of the 
mediated agreement when competition and the economy rendered him unable to continue the 
$2,200 per month payments, and he quit making them. Wife (by then pro se as well) filed a 
"complaint" in the divorce case (CV DR 06-13448) for the arrearages and husband responded 
with a motion to terminate any further obligation for spousal support on the ground wife had 
remarried and he was financially unable to make further support payment in any event. Wife 
retained new (current) counsel, who voluntarily dismissed her pro se complaint. The magistrate 
denied husband's motion to terminate spousal support, concluding per the "stipulation," the 
support provision was not merged in the decree and that the court therefore no longer had 
jurisdiction to consider modification for changed circumstances. (C.R. 174, 181-183). Plaintiff 
wife then filed the instant suit in District Court as a separate action for breach of the putative 
"separate" contract. 
Wife then moved for summary judgment on the ground the support provision was not 
merged in the divorce decree and thus was not susceptible to modification for changed 
circumstances. Husband opposed the motion on the ground the form of "judgment and decree of 
divorce" to which he had truly stipulated made the entire mediated agreement (including its 
spousal support provision) "an integral and non-separable" part of (i.e., was merged in) the 
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decree and thus there was no meeting of the minds as to any "agreement" to entry of a form of 
decree that would carve off the spousal support provision to render it impervious to modification 
for materially changed circumstances. Affidavit of Joseph L. Soelberg in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, C. R. 129-138. 
Despite husband's affidavit and its inclusion (as Exhibit A and Exhibit B) of the two 
different "forms" of decree; and despite husband's explanation of the fact Exhibit A was what 
was attached to the stipulation when he signed it, whereas Exhibit B was what wife's counsel 
presented to the magistrate for entry (and which the magistrate did enter); and despite the fact 
even wife's own affidavit in support of summary judgment likewise adopted Appendix A and not 
Appendix B (C.R. 106, paragraph 4 and C.R. 108), the District Court nonetheless granted wife 
summary judgment, stating in its Memorandum Decision and Order at 3: 
Soelberg does not address in his affidavit the Stipulation he signed in 2007 with 
the attached form that reads exactly as the Divorce Decree entered in 2007. 
C.R. 188. But Soelberg does address in his affidavit the Stipulation he signed in 2007 and he 
also addresses why the form attached to the stipulation by the time it was filed by wife's attorneys 
does indeed read "exactly as the divorce decree entered in 2007": It reads the same because the 
form filed with the stipulation and presented to the magistrate for entry wasn't the same form 
as was attached to the stipulation when husband signed it. And nowhere did the District Court 
address the fact that even wife's own affidavit in support of summary judgment also reflects the 
switch (C.R. 108). 
Defendant husband elected to file his notice of appeal shortly thereafter (C.R. 200-203), 
which became effective upon the District Court's February 7, 2012 entry of judgment (C.R. 204-
205). 
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Statement of Facts 
Inasmuch as this is an appeal from summary judgment for plaintiff wife, husband here 
cannibalizes the facts from his affidavit in opposition to plaintiffs motion therefor (C.R. 129-
138): 
During the parties' marriage, they acquired, as community property, two residences in 
which they had, at the time of their mediated divorce, equity of $66,000 and $72,000, 
respectively - a difference of just $6,000. They also acquired, as community property, 
businesses that included an income-producing one known as The Litigation Document Group of 
Boise, LLC ("Litigation Document Group"), together with attendant business debt of 
approximately a million dollars and another business known as Las Vegas Legal Technologies, 
LLC, together with its attendant business debt of another roughly a half-million dollars. 
As reflected in the "Property and Debt Schedule" that was part of the agreement 
(C.R. 119-120), the parties each received a distribution of one of the residences, with husband 
receiving the one with the greater equity - by a mere $6,000. In addition to the house with the 
$6,000 greater equity, husband also received the two businesses, but only with their attendant 
debt of fully $1,500,000. The parties were divorced in March of 2007. Husband's income for 
the last full year preceding the divorce, i.e., 2006, was $103,728. The provision for "spousal 
support" quoted by plaintiff in her complaint (i.e., $264,000 over a 10-year period) was intended 
by the parties to equalize her community property interest in what were, at the time of the 
agreement, seemingly solid, income-producing businesses. Those businesses were the sole 
sources of husband's income. 
At all times throughout the parties' divorce proceedings, wife was represented by 
attorney Stanley W. Welsh, whereas husband, who has no legal training, was unrepresented. At 
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no time did plaintiff or her then attorney call to husband's attention the fact Welsh had inserted 
language into the proposed Judgment and Decree of Divorce that would differ from the mediated 
agreement by stating "The Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 2007 is hereby merged and 
incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for Paragraph L which is not merged and shall 
remain a separate contract between the parties." Emphasis added. Moreover, at no time did 
plaintiff or Welsh call to husband's attention any purpose they had to insert that language in 
order to prevent the divorce court from later reviewing the "spousal support" part of the parties' 
mediated agreement in light of future changed circumstances. 
The Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement into which the parties 
entered purported, and was intended by them, to resolve all of the issues between them, including 
the division of their community property and the custody, visitation and support of their two then 
minor children. Husband understood, based on everything said by the plaintiff, by her attorney 
and by the mediator, that the entirety of the parties' Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement 
Agreement would be made effective by submittal to the divorce court for "adopting" in a 
judgment or decree. Review of the mediated agreement itself discloses it contains no provision 
whatsoever that would distinguish "Paragraph L" from the parties' intent for the entire agreement 
to be adopted by (i.e., merged in) the decree. (C.R.110-120) 
When Welsh's assistant presented husband with the stipulation for entry of the judgment 
and decree, she only said something about his addition in the form of the judgment and decree of 
some "minor" language to what was in the actual mediated agreement, which husband 
understood to mean some legal formality that would not affect in any way the substance or effect 
of what he had just agreed to in the mediation. Husband signed the proffered stipulation and 
gave it back to the assistant. 
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Husband believes the first page of the form of judgment and decree he was shown by 
Welsh's assistant when they sought his stipulation to its entry by the divorce court was the same 
one plaintiff herself attached as Exhibit 1 to her affidavit in support of summary judgment and it 
included, on its first page, the following: 
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated 
March 9, 2007 is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part 
of this decree of divorce and" 
(C.R. 108; 136; Appendix A) Husband does not recall whether the second page of the judgment 
form included the balance of the carry-over sentence at the bottom of its page one, but he 
distinctly remembers "knowing" that the entirety of the parties' Mediated Parenting and Property 
Settlement Agreement was to be approved by the divorce court and "made an integral and non-
separable part of [the] decree of divorce," which was their whole purpose in submitting to 
mediation at all. 
Nothing in what was said to husband by Welsh's assistant and nothing in the stipulation 
for entry of the judgment and decree called to his attention the fact that the form of judgment and 
decree Welsh had drawn and would present to the divorce court for entry carved off an exception 
to merger for the "spousal support" provision of the mediated agreement. Moreover, as set forth 
above, the first page of the judgment form with which husband was presented stated, 
specifically, that "the Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 2007 [i.e., all of it] is hereby 
approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this decree of divorce and," which 
conformed to what husband's understanding was all along. 
In truth and in fact, however, the form of judgment and decree Welsh had drawn and 
would present to the divorce court for entry, and which in fact the divorce court did enter, is the 
one appended hereto as Appendix B. It differs materially from the form that was attached to the 
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proffered stipulation when husband signed it in that it deleted the language at the bottom of its 
first page (quoted above) and included at the top of its second page the following: 
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 
9, 2007 is hereby merged and incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for 
Paragraph L which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between 
the parties." 
Emphasis added. It must be noted that husband does not recall whether the provision just 
quoted was also in the form of judgment and decree Welsh's assistant presented to him (the first 
page of which is Appendix A hereto), but he does know he did not notice it or attach any 
significance to it if it was. Husband believes and urges this is reasonable and understandable in 
view of the language with which the first page concluded, i.e., " the Mediation Agreement dated 
March 9, 2007 [i.e., all of it] is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part 
of this decree of divorce and". 
Husband thought everything about plaintiffs and his divorce, including any necessary 
future modifications of it, would be handled in the divorce court, and that everything in the 
parties' Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement was to be confirmed and 
adopted by the divorce court's Judgment and Decree. Husband did not notice, understand the 
legal import of or attach any significance to the fact Welsh had, in the form of judgment and 
decree he submitted to the divorce court for entry, carved off an "exception" against merger of 
paragraph "L" - and only paragraph L - of the Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement 
Agreement which, although not identified or described in any way, was the subject provision for 
spousal support. The judgment and decree drawn by Welsh and submitted to the divorce court 
for its entry, and which was in fact entered, is Appendix B. 
Since the parties' divorce in March 2007, both of the litigation-related businesses 
received by husband pursuant to the mediated agreement have failed and dissolved, and 
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Litigation Document Group received a Chapter 7 discharge of its debts in bankruptcy. Other than 
the discharge of Litigation Document Group's debts, husband received nothing of value for his 
ownership thereof. He continued to make payments on the business debt of the other business, 
although it, too, has closed its doors and is dissolved. At or about the time of the parties' divorce, 
husband started a third business, known as Data One, LLC in Boise, the primary product of 
which was to be the provision of records scanning and archival, along with copying. Since 
husband's post-divorce formation of Data One, LLC, five competitors have entered the Boise 
market for provision of the same services, nearly eliminating its profitability. It has downsized 
from a business employing five or six salaried employees to just one. It is husband's sole source 
of income. 
Plaintiff was remarried on October 10,2010, and husband has likewise remarried. 
As the result of the collapse of Litigation Document Group of Boise, LLC and Las Vegas Legal 
Technologies, LLC, coupled with the entry of so many competitors into the market for Data 
One's goods and services, husband is struggling to provide necessaries for his own family, 
whereas the businesses he received as the consideration for the subject spousal support provision 
have proved entirely worthless. Husband has already paid to plaintiff the sum of at least $93,100 
pursuant to the subject "spousal support" provision a sum that exceeds by some $87,000 what 
was distributed to him in what was understood and intended by both parties to be a roughly 
equal distribution of the community property. Husband's total income for 2011 through 
November was just $31,193 or less than one-third of what his annual income was when the 
parties entered into the "spousal support" agreement on which wife sues - in District Court, as a 
"separate contract". 
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Enforcement of the "spousal support" prOVISIOn plaintiff sues on works an 
extreme hardship on husband and on his family due to the unforeseeable failure of the businesses 
it was the intent of the agreement to "equalize" by means of the payments to plaintiff wife. For 
that reason, he wants the opportunity to persuade the divorce court, if he can, to terminate the 
spousal support provision "Paragraph L" due to his materially changed circumstances and the 
prevailing equities. Because he never had any intent to treat the spousal support provision 
differently that any other provision of the mediated agreement as respects its merger in the 
decree (and thus its amenability to continuing review and modification as justice might require), 
the District Court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that he so agreed. Genuine issues of 
material fact preclude that finding .. Because the intent of Idaho's community property scheme is 
to maintain a more-or-less equal balance between both spouses in the event of divorce; because 
the "spousal support" provision set forth in paragraph L of the Mediated Parenting and Property 
Settlement Agreement has already yielded an $87,000 bonus to plaintiff and because the true 
value of the businesses defendant received has turned out to be wholly illusory, the lower court's 
award of summary judgment to plaintiff wife should be reversed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for plaintiff 
wife. 
2. Whether the parties' mediated agreement - in its entirety was merged in the 
decree and is subject to the divorce court's review and modification for changed circumstances. 
3. Whether the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
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4. Whether the mediated agreement discloses any intent for internal integration and 
if not, whether the agreement evidences any contractual consideration for husband's spousal 
support obligation. 
5. Whether husband's material change in his financial circumstances would support 
termination by the divorce court of any obligation for spousal support, given a void of any 
evidence that plaintiff isn't perfectly capable of earning a living to support herself. 
6. Whether the District Court erred in its award of attorney fees to plaintiff wife. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for plaintiff. 
It is axiomatic that a genuine issue of material fact is fatal to a motion for summary 
judgment: 
The requirements of Rule 56( e) are intended to provide the trial court with 
sworn factual statements based on personal knowledge that are intended to be put 
on as evidence at trial. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a verified 
complaint alone may meet the requirements of Rule 56( e). Camp v. Jiminez, 107 
Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App.l984). While this Court has never had the 
opportunity [to] address whether a verified complaint alone meets the 
requirements of Rule 56( e), we hold that the heirs met and satisfied the 
requirements of the rule when they relied on their depositions, in addition to, the 
sworn contents of the verified amended complaint and the numerous exhibits 
attached thereto. As long as the non-moving party relies on statements that are 
based on personal knowledge and which would be admissible as evidence at trial 
and does more than rest on mere allegations or denials in his pleading, it will be 
considered sufficient to comply with Rule 56(e). See LR.C.P. 56(e). 
Even if the district court had been correct in concluding that Rule 56(e) 
required the heirs to submit affidavits or evidentiary matter other than those relied 
upon by the moving party, the requirements of Rule 56(e) would have been met 
for an even more fundamental reason. In Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 
Idaho 306, 442 P .2d 442 (1968), the respondent sought to uphold the trial court's 
order by charging that the appellant had not complied with Rule 56( e) because of 
failure to submit affidavits in response to the motion. In Turner, we approved of 
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the Federal Advisory Committee explanation of the identical Federal rule and 
quoted the Committee saying: "Where the evidentiary matter in support of the 
motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must 
be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented." Central Idaho 
Agency, 92 Idaho at 310,442 P.2d at 446. 
This explanation follows directly from LR.C.P. 56(e) because even without an 
affidavit or other "opposing evidentiary matter" presented by the non-moving 
party, summary jUdgment will not be "appropriate," as that term should be 
understood in the last sentence of Rule 56(e), if the motion for summary judgment 
fails to eliminate all genuine issues of material fact. Thus, assuming that the 
original pleadings raise genuine issues of material fact, Rule 56(e) indicates that 
the non-moving party is only required to counter the assertions made by the 
movant, by tendering affidavits, depositions, or other sworn statements, if the 
motion puts at issue the question of whether material issues of genuine fact 
remain. If there are any genuine issues of material fact which remain to be 
determined by the trial court after receiving the motion for summary judgment 
then by definition summary judgment is not appropriate. LR.C.P. 56(e). 
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 770-771, 820 P.2d 360,365 - 366 (1991). 
Here, wife bases her campaign for conversion of a modifiable spousal support provision 
into a non-modifiable "separate contract" on her sworn assertion that defendant agreed to do so: 
"Joseph and I agreed that this provision should be treated like a contract. We 
agreed not to merge this provision with the divorce decree. See Exhibit 1 
incorporated herewith by reference, a true and correct copy of the parties['] 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce." 
Affidavit [of plaintiff] in support of motion for summary judgment, paragraph 4 (C.R. 106), 
emphasis added; accord, Supplemental affidavit of plaintiff in support of motion for summary 
judgment (C.R. 170). She makes this claim despite the fact nothing in the Mediated Parenting 
Agreement and Property Settlement suggests any such thing. Moreover, Exhibit 1 to plaintiffs 
initial affidavit itself creates an issue of fact as to this assertion because it posits by its own terms 
at the bottom of page one the adoption of the agreement as an "integral" and "non-separable" 
part of the Judgment and Decree. Finally, defendant's affidavit makes plain the fact he did not 
so agree and was in fact "had" by Welsh's inclusion of the "integral" and "non-separable" 
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language at the bottom of the form of judgment and decree with which he was presented for 
approval but which Welsh then deleted from the form he would present to the magistrate for 
entry: 
8. At all times throughout the plaintiffs and my divorce proceedings, she 
was represented by attorney Stanley W. Welsh, whereas I was unrepresented. I 
have no legal training. 
9. At no time did plaintiff or her then attorney, Mr. Welsh, call to my 
attention the fact Welsh had inserted language into the proposed Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce that would differ from the mediated agreement by stating "The 
Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 2007 is hereby merged and incorporated 
into this decree of divorce, except for Paragraph L which is not merged and shall 
remain a separate contract between the parties." Emphasis added. Nor at any 
time did plaintiff or Mr. Welsh call to my attention any purpose they had to insert 
that language in order to prevent the divorce court from reviewing the "spousal 
support" part of our mediated agreement for modification or termination in the 
event fairness, equity and justice required it in light of future changed 
circumstances. 
10. The Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement into 
which plaintiff and I entered purported, and was intended by us, to resolve all of 
the issues between us, including the division of our community property and the 
custody, visitation and support of our two minor children. 
11. I understood, based on everything said by the plaintiff, by her 
attorney Stanley W. Welsh and by the mediator, that the entirety of our Mediated 
Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement would be made effective by 
submittal to the divorce court for "adopting" in ajudgment or decree. 
12. When attorney Welsh's assistant presented me with the stipulation 
for the entry of the judgment and decree, she said something about his addition in 
the form of the judgment and decree of some "minor" language to what was in the 
actual mediated agreement, which I understood to mean some legal formality that 
would not affect in any way the substance or effect of what I had just agreed to in 
the mediation. 
13. I believe the first page of the form of judgment and decree I was 
shown by Welsh's assistant when they sought my stipulation to its entry by the 
divorce court was the same one plaintiff has attached as Exhibit 1 to her affidavit 
in support of summary judgment and it included, on its first page, the following: 
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"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated 
March 9,2007 is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part 
of this decree of divorce and" 
A true and correct copy is attached hereto for the convenience of the Court 
as Exhibit A. [Appendix A hereto.] 
14. I do not now recall whether the second page of the judgment form 
included the balance of the carry-over sentence at the bottom of its page one, but I 
distinctly remember "knowing" that the entirety of our Mediated Parenting and 
Property Settlement Agreement was to be approved by the divorce court and 
"made an integral and non-separable part of [the] decree of divorce," which was 
our whole purpose in submitting to mediation at all. 
15. Nothing in what was said to me by Welsh's assistant and nothing in 
the stipulation for entry of the judgment and decree called to my attention the fact 
that the form of judgment and decree Welsh had drawn and would present to the 
divorce court for entry carved off an exception to merger for the "spousal support" 
provision of the mediated property settlement agreement. Moreover, as set forth 
above, the first page of the judgment form with which I was presented stated, 
specifically, that "the Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 2007 [i.e., all of it] is 
hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this decree of 
divorce and," which conformed to what my understanding was all along. 
16. In fact the form of judgment and decree Welsh had drawn and 
would present to the divorce court for entry, and which in fact the divorce court 
did enter, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. [Appendix B hereto.] It deleted the 
language quoted above in paragraph 13 hereof and included on its second page 
the following: 
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 
9, 2007 is hereby merged and incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for 
Paragraph L which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between 
the parties." 
Emphasis added. I do not now recall whether the provision here quoted was also 
in the form of judgment and decree Welsh's assistant presented to me (the first 
page of which is Exhibit A hereto), but I know I did not notice it or attach any 
significance to it if it was. I believe this is reasonable and understandable in view 
of the language with which the first page concluded, i.e., " the Mediation 
Agreement dated March 9, 2007 [i.e., all of it] is hereby approved and made an 
integral and non-separable part of this decree of divorce and". 
17. I thought everything about plaintiff's and my divorce, including 
any necessary future modifications of it, would be handled in the divorce court, 
and that everything in our Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement 
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Agreement was to be confirmed and adopted by the divorce court's Judgment and 
Decree. 
18. I did not notice, understand the legal import of or attach any 
significance to the fact Welsh had, in the form of judgment and decree he 
submitted to the divorce court for entry, carved off an "exception" against merger 
of paragraph "L" of the Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement 
which, although not otherwise identified or described, was the subject provision 
for spousal support. The judgment and decree drawn by Welsh and submitted to 
the divorce court for its entry, and which was in fact entered, is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. 
(C.R. 130-133) Accordingly, the major factual premise upon which plaintiffs motion was based 
- i.e., that the "spousal support" provision of the Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property 
Settlement Agreement should be treated "like" a contract because defendant "agreed" to do so 
was directly controverted by husband's affidavit and at least indirectly by plaintiffs own 
affidavit, which likewise included Appendix A, not Appendix B. 
2. Idaho law presumes (rebuttably, but only by "clear and convincing 
evidence") that (a) the subject spousal support and property settlement agreement is 
merged in the decree and (b) the agreement itself is not an "integrated" agreement, such 
that (c) there is no longer a contract at all, only the divorce court's ever-modifiable decree. 
This case is squarely controlled by Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442, 958 P.2d 599 (1998). 
That case very clearly illuminates the somewhat technical but crucial distinction between making 
a spousal support and property settlement agreement an "integral" part of the decree, i.e., 
"merged," as here, and the determination whether the agreement itself is "integrated" internally, 
which is not the case here. This is no mere matter of semantics, but a fundamental principle of 
divorce law. If the agreement is merged in the decree, as here, then the spousal support 
provision is subject to modification or termination by the divorce court - unless it is an 
"integrated" agreement, in which case it can't be modified even if merged in the decree. But if it 
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is merged and is not an integrated agreement (which is what we have here), then the divorce 
court retains continuing jurisdiction to modify or terminate the spousal support provision 
whenever changed circumstances warrant it. While somewhat involved, Keeler explains it very 
well: 
An agreement providing for spousal support payments cannot ordinarily 
be modified by the court unless the terms of the agreement were incorporated or 
"merged" into the divorce decree. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737, 739 n. 6, 
639 P.2d 435 n. 6 (1981); Roesbery v. Roesbery, 88 Idaho 514, 521, 401 P.2d 805, 
809 (1965); Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 75 Idaho 13,265 P.2d 662 (1954). When 
the settlement agreement has been merged into the decree, support provisions in 
the agreement may be modified without the mutual consent of the parties because 
the agreement has become part of the court's judgment; absent merger, the 
agreement stands independent of the decree, and "the obligations imposed under 
the agreement are not those imposed by decree but by contract." Bainbridge, 75 
Idaho at 24, 265 P.2d at 669. In this case, the magistrate found that the agreement 
was merged into the decree of divorce, and that finding is not contested by either 
party. 
Even where the agreement has been merged into the decree, however, 
support terms cannot be judicially modified if the agreement is integrated. A 
property settlement and spousal support agreement is integrated "if the parties 
have agreed that the provisions relating to division of property and the provisions 
relating to support constitute reciprocal consideration [so that the] support 
provisions are ... necessarily part and parcel of a division of property." Kimball v. 
Kimball, 83 Idaho 12, 17, 356 P.2d 919, 922 (1960). See also Phillips v. Phillips, 
93 Idaho 384, 385,462 P.2d 49,50 (1969); Gortsema v. Gortsema, 92 Idaho 684, 
688,448 P.2d 777, 781 (1968); Turner v. Turner, 90 Idaho 308, 314, 410 P.2d 
648,654 (1966); Roesbery, 88 Idaho at 519, 401 P.2d at 808. 
Thus, a court which has been called upon to modify provisions regarding 
support must determine whether the parties reached an agreement regarding 
integration. This has not proven to be an easy task. In a series of decisions, the 
Idaho Supreme Court determined whether property settlement and support 
agreements were integrated, focusing primarily upon the terminology used in the 
agreements at issue. See, e.g., Gortsema, supra; Roesbery, supra; Kimball, supra. 
However, in 1969, by its decision in Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 462 P.2d 
49 (1969), the Supreme Court significantly altered the manner in which the 
doctrines of integration and merger are to be applied in divorce cases. In 
abandoning its previous approach, the Phillips Court observed: 
It is our belief that in its attempts to determine the intent of the parties regarding 
integration or non-integration of the provisions of separations agreements, this 
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Court has been forced to indulge in technical hair splitting. In some cases the 
court has held agreements to be integrated ... while in other cases agreements 
which were substantially the same but for a word or two have been held to be 
non-integrated. 
Phillips, 93 Idaho at 386, 462 P.2d at 51 (citations omitted). Taking a new 
direction, the Court held that when an agreement for division of property and 
support payments has been presented to the divorce court for approval, it will be 
rebuttably presumed that the agreement was not integrated and was therefore 
subject to judicial mod(fication. The Court stated: 
[W]hen parties enter into an agreement of separation in contemplation of divorce 
and thereafter the agreement is presented to a district court in which a divorce 
action is pending and the court is requested to approve, ratify or confirm the 
agreement, certain presumptions arise. In the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that each provision of such an 
agreement is independent of all other provisions and that such agreement is not 
integrated; it will be further presumed that the agreement is merged into the 
decree of divorce, is enforceable as a part thereof and if necessary may be 
modified by the court in the future. 
Id. at 387, 462 P.2d at 52. See also Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338, 766 
P.2d 1219 (1988) (applying the clear and convincing evidence test); Sullivan v. 
Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737, 743, 639 P.2d 435, 441 (1981) (Shepard, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging the presumption outlined in Phillips ); Phillips v. Dist. Court of 
FijthJudicial Dist., 95 Idaho 404, 509 P.2d 1325 (1973) (same). 
A rebuttable presumption imposes upon the party against whom it operates the 
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 301. According to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Phillips, that 
rebuttal must be made by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the 
magistrate found that the evidence of integration did not rise to the level of clear 
and convincing evidence and therefore did not rebut the non-integration 
presumption. This determination, like other findings of fact regarding the weight 
of evidence, must be given deference by this Court unless it is clearly erroneous. 
We find no error here, based upon the conflicting evidence presented to the 
magistrate. 
In her appellate argument, Judith relies heavily upon asserted similarities between 
the language in the Keelers' agreement and the agreement involved in Roesbery, 
supra, which the Supreme Court found sufficient to establish that the agreement 
was integrated. We find this argument inapposite, however, in light of the 
Supreme Court's disavowal of the approach utilized in Roesbery and other pre-
Phillips cases which relied heavily upon parsing the language of agreements and 
"technical hair splitting." It is sufficient to say that the Keelers' property 
settlement and support agreement nowhere clearly and unambiguously expresses 
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an intent of the parties regarding integration. We therefore decline to disturb the 
magistrate's finding that the Keelers' agreement was not integrated and was 
subject to judicial modification. 
Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442,444-446,958 P.2d 599, 601 - 603 (Idaho App.,1998), emphasis 
added. 
3. The District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case, because the 
divorce court by statute has "exclusive" jurisdiction over spousal support. 
This issue is determined by application of statutory law: 
7-1015. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal support order 
(1) A tribunal of this state issuing a spousal support order consistent with the law 
of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support 
order throughout the existence of the support obligation. 
Because plaintiff did not (and could not, on a duly controverted motion for summary judgment) 
overcome the presumption of (a) merger in the decree and (b) non-integration of the spousal 
support and property settlement provisions with "clear and convincing" evidence, I.C. § 7-1015 
is directly applicable and the tribunal of this state that issued the spousal support order (i.e., the 
Judgment and Decree of divorce) had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. The magistrate division 
is admittedly a part of the District Court, but the statute clearly operates to preclude what the 
plaintiff accomplished below: she obtained the divorce court's acceptance of a mediated 
resolution, only to attempt by a form of shell game to cut off that court's statutory power of 
continuing review, thus to preclude its continuing assessment of the controlling equities. 
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4. Even if Paragraph L ("Spousal Support") of the Mediated Parenting Agreement 
and Property Settlement Agreement were to be treated "like" a contract, plaintiffs claim 
fails because Paragraph L is, on its face, devoid of any requisite consideration. 
In her effort to take further advantage of defendant, plaintiff successfully asked the lower 
court to treat the following "like" a contract: 
"L. Spousal Support: 
1. JOSEPH agrees to pay ANNETTE spousal support in the amount 
of $2,200 per month for a period of ten (10) years." 
(C.R. 106; 171; 116) Those tiny few words represent the entire universe of what it is plaintiff 
asks this Court to treat "like" a contract. And inasmuch as a plaintiffs choice of tactic in 
litigation is inherently self-serving, it can be taken it as gospel the plaintiff knows full well she 
would realize less money if the "Spousal Support" provision were treated as a "spousal support" 
provision and thus subject to review in the divorce court for any termination or modification that 
might be necessary in light of defendant's woefully changed circumstances. Idaho Code § 7-
1015(1) provides: 
A tribunal of this state issuing a spousal support order consistent with the law of 
this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support 
order throughout the existence of the support obligation. 
Having elected to invoke the power of the power of the District Court to treat the spousal support 
provision "like" a contract, plaintiff cannot be heard to complain if contract law defeats her 
claim. 
It does. In order for a contract to exist, a distinct understanding common to both parties 
is necessary. Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 174 P.2d 202 (1946). Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 
Idaho 396, 400, 582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978). Here, there is a stark issue of fact that defeats 
plaintiffs motion: She says, in paragraph 4 of her affidavit, that the parties "agreed" the spousal 
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support provision "should be" treated "like" a contract. Defendant, on the other hand, says he 
never agreed to any such thing and that he was in fact fooled by Welsh's presentation of the 
"dummy" judgment form (Exhibit 1 to plaintiffs affidavit (C.R. 108; Exhibit A to defendant's 
affidavit (C.R. 136); Appendix A hereto) that specifically stated the mediated spousal support/ 
property settlement agreement was to be "made an integral and !l!l!!:..-separable part of this 
decree." Defendant distinctly remembers "knowing" that "the entirety of our Mediated 
Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement was to be approved by the divorce court and 
'made an integral and non-separable part of [the] decree of divorce,' which was our whole 
purpose in submitting to mediation at all." Affidavit of Joseph L. Soelberg, paragraph 14. (C.R. 
132) Accordingly, the would-be "contract" on which plaintiff here sues fails because there was 
no "distinct understanding common to both parties" that the spousal support provision was to 
elevated to some eternal "gotcha" status unique among every other provision of their global 
resolution of the issues between them. In fact, plaintiff fails even to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact that would defeat summary judgment for defendant, because there is a legal 
presumption in favor of merger into the decree and against integration, which presumption 
can be rebutted only by "clear and convincing" evidence: 
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, it will be 
presumed that each provision of such an agreement is independent of all other 
provisions and that such agreement is not integrated; it will be further presumed 
that the agreement is merged into the decree of divorce, is enforceable as a part 
thereof and if necessary may be modified by the court in the future. 
Phillips v. Phillips, 462 P.2d 49,52 (Idaho 1969). See also Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Idaho 
338, 766 P.2d 1219 (1988) (applying the clear and convincing evidence test). Nowhere in the 
entire Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement is there one single 
word to suggest integration or any intent to make its Paragraph L "spousal support" provision 
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immune to review by the divorce court for continuing fairness or legitimacy. Plaintiffs hopes 
for the success of her counsel's sleight-of-hand must go unrewarded. 
Plaintiffs wish to treat Paragraph L "like" a contract fails for another reason, too: To be 
enforceable, a contract must be supported by mutual consideration: 
The essential elements of a valid contract are: offer, acceptance, and bargained for 
consideration. State ex reI. Career Aviation Sales, Inc. v. Cohen, 952 S.W.2d 324, 
326 (Mo.App. E.D.1997). The parties must have a mutuality of assent or a 
meeting of the minds on these essential terms of a contract. Building Erection 
Services Co. v. Plastic Sales & Mfg. Co., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Mo.App. 
W.D.2005). The forbearance to enforce a legal right such as filing a lawsuit can 
constitute bargained for consideration. See Holt v. Jamieson, 847 S.W.2d 194, 
197 (Mo.App. E.D.1993); and Missouri Farmers Ass'n, Inc. v. Barry, 710 S.W.2d 
923, 926 (Mo.App. W.D.1986). On the other hand, an expression to gratuitously 
do something, which is unsupported by consideration or unaccompanied by 
some bargaining, is normally an unenforceable promise. Cash v. Benward, 873 
S.W.2d 913,916 (Mo.App. W.D.1994). 
Drury v. Missouri Youth Soccer Ass'n, Inc., 259 S.W.3d 558, 574 -575 (Mo. App. 2008), 
emphasis added. Here, there is nothing whatsoever in Paragraph L - or anywhere else in the 
agreement, either, for that matter - that even purports to constitute "consideration" for 
defendant's otherwise gratuitous promise to pay plaintiff post-divorce support. Paragraph L, 
entilted "Spousal Support," remains just that: A spousal support provision in a Mediated 
Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement which, lacking either an integration 
clause, "clear and convincing evidence" of a mutual intent for integration, or consideration, did 
not magically morph into a binding, stand-alone contract as plaintiff contends. It was at all 
times simply part and parcel of a mediated divorce agreement that was merged in the decree. 
5. Had plaintiff chosen to maintain her claim in the divorce court, where she 
initially brought it, it would have been subject to termination for the extreme hardship it 
would now work on defendant. 
The parties were divorced over five years ago. Their community property was divided 
between them pursuant to a mediated property settlement, more or less equally as required by 
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I.e. § 32-712. They have both remarried. The children, including the son plaintiff transferred 
custody of to defendant to facilitate her move to Texas, are no longer minors. 
Plaintiff would certainly prefer it if defendant would augment her own Income by 
sending her $2,200 each month for another half-decade. Defendant should be relieved cif any 
obligation it to do so. He's barely remaining financially afloat himself, and he has a family of his 
own to support. He was earning over $100,000 a year when as a pro se divorce litigant he 
entered into the subject Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement with 
plaintiff. Both of the businesses he received (along with their $1.5 million debt) in the property 
settlement have permanently tanked. They were his livelihood. The new business he started has 
been hamstrung by the post-2008 economy and a swarm of new competitors. He now makes just 
$31,000 per year. 
The reason for plaintiffs conscious decision to abandon her claim in divorce court and to 
pursue it here is obvious: Any rational, fair-minded magistrate considering and applying the 
principles of Title 32, Chapter 7, and I.C. § 32-705 would necessarily conclude plaintiff cannot 
establish even the threshold for a maintenance award, i.e., that she "lacks sufficient property to 
provide for her reasonable needs and is unable to support herself through employment." See, 
Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331, 900 P.2d 807 (Idaho App. 1995): 
The 1990 amendments to the statute, however, were meant to eliminate 
fault as a prerequisite, relegating it to one of many factors to be considered. The 
Statement of Purpose issued by the legislature with the amendment states: 
The purpose of this legislation is to remove fault as a requirement for the award 
of alimony. 
The need of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay would 
become the primary basis for alimony awards. 
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Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331, 334,900 P.2d 807,810 (Idaho App.1995), emphasis added. 
This is consistent with the rule in other jurisdictions that provides for termination of spousal 
maintenance where necessary to avoid "extreme hardship" and the like to the host spouse. See 
Robinson v. Robinson, 674 N.Y.S.2d 921 (N.Y. Sup. 1998); In re Marriage of Carpenter, 677 
N.E.2d 463 (Ill. App. 1997); Weber v. Weber, 589 N.W. 2d 358 (N.D. 1999); Jones v. Jones, 
651 A. 2d 157 (Pa. Super. 1994); In re Marriage of Maher, 420 N.E. 2d 1144 (Ill. App. 1981), 
and cases cited therein; See Compton v. Compton, 612 P. 2d 1175 (Idaho 1980); Harrigan v. 
Harrigan, 373 A. 2d 550 (Vt. 1977); Crosetto v. Crosetto, 397 P. 2d 418 (Wash. 1964); Crosby 
v.Crosby, 29 S.E. 2d (Va. 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
The spousal support provision on which plaintiff sues represents one paragraph from a 
comprehensive, non-integrated, Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement 
Agreement. Idaho law presumes it was intended to be merged in the ensuing decree, such that it 
would always remain subject to review by the divorce court for continuing need and fairness. 
This presumption can only be overcome by "clear and convincing" evidence, which plaintiff 
hasn't shown, nor could she show as any matter of uncontested fact in the face of defendant's 
controverting affidavit. 
Having made the conscious decision to abandon her chances in divorce court in the hope 
of having greater chances in the District Court on a counterfeit "separate contract" regardless of 
the merits or equities, plaintiff should be held to have no contract at all, since the universe of 
Paragraph L of the Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement is devoid 
of either consideration to support a separate contract or any clear indication of any intent to treat 
it as an integrated agreement. 
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Not only did genuine issues of material fact preclude the lower court's entry of summary 
judgment for plaintiff, the facts that are not in dispute defeat her claim. Plaintif.[ sues on an 
alleged "separate contract" and there simply is no such contract. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of Jun~".<-). 
Patrick D. Furey, Attorney at Law 
Counsel for defendant-appellant 
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